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IN MEMORIAM: BERNARD WOLFMAN 
The editors of the Harvard Law Review respectfully dedicate this 
issue to Professor Bernard Wolfman. 
 
Howard Abrams∗ 
I remember well the first day of Professor Wolfman’s corporate tax 
class in the fall of 1979.  The first assigned case — the first case in 
Professor Wolfman’s Little, Brown & Co. casebook — was General 
Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering.1  In that case, the General Util-
ities corporation distributed to its shareholders stock of a second cor-
poration.  The government contended that General Utilities recognized 
income on this distribution equal to the value of the distributed stock 
over its adjusted basis.  The government’s theory of the case was that 
a cash dividend had been declared and then satisfied with appreciated 
property, and as to that argument the Supreme Court held for the tax-
payer, saying that the Board of Tax Appeals had found as a fact that a 
cash dividend had neither been contemplated nor executed and that 
the trial court’s factual determination should be respected. 
The government also argued that a post-distribution sale of the 
shares by the distributee shareholders should have been attributed to 
the distributing corporation, but the Supreme Court rejected that ar-
gument as having been raised by the government too late to be consid-
ered.  We also read Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,2 where this 
second argument was timely pressed by the government and accepted 
by the Tax Court (the renamed Board of Tax Appeals).  This time the 
Supreme Court held for the government, again deferring to the factual 
finding of the trial court. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Professor, Emory Law School. 
 1 296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
 2 324 U.S. 331 (1945). 
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Professor Wolfman, a master of the Socratic method, asked whether 
a liquidating corporation should recognize gain on the distribution of 
appreciated property.  The student said no, that not even the govern-
ment argued the mere distribution of appreciated property should be a 
taxable event to the distributing corporation.  But Professor Wolfman 
pressed on: should it be taxable?  And again the student said no: as a 
general rule, section 311 of the Internal Revenue Code precluded a dis-
tribution from being taxable to the distributing corporation. 
Bernie had us read exceptions to this general rule of nonrecognition, 
some enacted by Congress and some created by the courts.  We read 
the supporting statutory rule that allowed corporations to avoid the 
Court Holding problem if they moved quickly enough (old section 
337), and we read a special rule that applied when shareholders were 
also creditors.  Subchapter C was full of rules: the General Utilities 
doctrine, codified in section 336, seemed just one of many.  What we 
did not read and what we did not understand was why the General 
Utilities case stood for a doctrine the Supreme Court did not discuss 
and why the General Utilities doctrine was such a big deal for the tax-
ation of corporations (described in Subchapter C of the income tax  
statute). 
Eventually we understood.  As the Wolfman casebook walked us 
through more of Subchapter C, we understood that the taxation of 
corporations and their shareholders could make sense and could be 
sensibly explained except for the General Utilities doctrine.  And, more 
importantly, we understood not only that the General Utilities doctrine 
was fundamentally unsound, but also that its failures infected almost 
everything else in Subchapter C.  The General Utilities doctrine may 
have been a small hole in the taxing system, but taxpayers inevitably 
found ways of driving their transactions through it.  Congress and the 
courts tried to patch that hole, but until Congress adopted a structural 
fix by repealing the General Utilities doctrine, those patches were 
doomed to fail.  Professor Wolfman centered the course around the 
General Utilities doctrine because the law itself was centered on it, not 
intentionally but unavoidably. 
I now teach the taxation of partners and their partnerships (de-
scribed in Subchapter K).  Most books start with the formation of a 
partnership, move to partnership operations, and end with partnership 
liquidations.  My book goes in a different order: I start with the alloca-
tion of partnership-level income among the partners — what are called 
distributive shares — because understanding distributive shares is cen-
tral to understanding almost every other part of Subchapter K.  I teach 
Subchapter K from the inside out — from deeper structure to superfi-
cial rules — because that is the only way to understand how all the 
pieces fit and why they fit the way they do.  I teach distributive shares 
first for the same reason that Bernie Wolfman taught General Utilities 
first, and I do it because he taught me how to teach. 
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With the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine in 1986, Bernie 
moved on to other things (and reordered his corporate tax casebook 
when it next was revised).  Over the last thirty years, Bernie and I 
spoke only occasionally and wrote to one another now and again.  
Most recently, I wanted to talk about the proliferation of anti-abuse 
rules; he wanted to talk about changes to the legal profession.  The 
Code was littered with anti-abuse rules that obscured structure, in-
creased compliance costs, and arbitrarily treated similar transactions 
differently.  Anti-abuse rules multiplied, he said, because tax lawyers 
had lost their way, moving from being stewards in a noble profession 
to being shills for their tax-minimizing clients.  Courts and Congress 
were trying to patch a broken profession; fixing the Code required fix-
ing the profession.  Once again Bernie found the heart of the matter.  
He was a great teacher. 
 
William D. Andrews∗ 
I met Bernie Wolfman in 1964 when he came to Harvard Law 
School as a visiting professor.  We had each had one year’s experience 
as full-time law teachers, and our principal subject was federal income 
taxation.  We both had a great deal of fun at it, and we shared that in 
frequent conversations.  Clark Byse commented years later on his en-
tertainment at observing the two of us going off for coffee together, 
every morning he claimed, even before classes. 
But there were important differences.  Bernie had practiced tax law 
for fifteen years at Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, in Philadel-
phia, the last two of them as managing partner.  I had spent much less 
time in law practice, and hardly any of it in tax.  So Bernie taught me 
much more than I had to offer in return. 
Another contrast was military service.  I served in the Navy during 
the brief period of peace following the Korean War.  Bernie was in the 
Army during the climax of the Second World War.  He liked to talk 
about the army language school where he had been taught Norwegian.  
Indeed he liked to demonstrate some of what he remembered years 
later.  When it became clear the war would not reach Norway, Bernie 
was sent instead to the trenches of France, where he would have been 
in the middle of the Battle of the Bulge but for the fact that his feet 
froze and he was evacuated shortly before that battle began. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Eli Goldston Professor of Law, Emeritus, Harvard Law School. 
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Despite our different backgrounds, we had become fast friends at 
HLS in 1964–1965.  Bernie was invited to stay on at HLS in 1965, but 
he turned it down.  I was deeply disappointed, but his decision now 
seems completely in character.  He had close old friends on the Penn 
Law faculty, and I think he was unwilling to leave them after only one 
year there.  Also, I would guess that his family’s roots in Pennsylvania 
had not been fully replaced in one short year in Massachusetts. 
Bernie stayed at Penn for fifteen years, the last five as Dean.  Fi-
nally in 1976 he finished his deanship at Penn and accepted an invita-
tion to come back to HLS as the Fessenden Professor of Law, a posi-
tion in which he served until both of us retired, thirty-one years later, 
in June 2007. 
Together again in Cambridge, Bernie and I took pleasure in shared 
interests that extended beyond tax law.  For instance, we both had a 
lifelong fascination with language and words.  We read and discussed 
new books about language, particularly The Language Instinct (1994) 
and Words and Rules (1999), both by Professor Steven Pinker, then at 
MIT. 
Sometime not long after the appearance of the latter book, Bernie 
told me that Professor Pinker had accepted his invitation to come over 
from MIT for lunch, and he invited me to join them.  It was a long 
and enjoyable lunch hour, but what I particularly remember is Bernie 
delicately raising a question about the following sentence in the book 
jacket: “In Words and Rules, Pinker explains the profound mysteries of 
language by picking a deceptively single phenomenon and examining 
it from every angle.”  Bernie did not think “deceptively single” made 
sense, and after some discussion Pinker agreed.  I think Bernie would 
be pleased to know that the cover of a later edition uses the expression 
“deceptively simple single phenomenon” and that the back cover of the 
paperback edition refers (more simply?) to a “deceptively simple phe-
nomenon.”  Bernie was always intellectually engaged, regardless of the 
subject matter, and loved the craft of writing. 
Bernie was an author and editor himself, having compiled his own 
casebook for teaching the advanced course in federal income taxation 
of corporate transactions.  At around the same time, I compiled a case-
book for use in the basic income tax course.  Both of us then had  
children incurring substantial college or secondary school fees. 
Bernie then decided it would be useful to transfer the copyright for 
his casebook into a trust, for a period of at least ten years, with a di-
rection to distribute the income as needed among his children.  He 
then appointed me to serve as the trustee. 
I thought so well of this idea that I followed suit, designating him 
as trustee to hold the copyright for my casebook in trust for my child- 
ren.  The publisher thereafter duly noted that the copyright owner for 
the Wolfman book was William D. Andrews, trustee, and vice versa.  
As a result of this arrangement I got to know the Wolfman children a 
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little better, and my children came to refer to Wolfman as Uncle Ber-
nie.  Moreover, the royalty income was taxed to the children to whom 
it was distributed, instead of to their fathers. 
Uncle or not, Bernie was always a great and dependable friend, 
and I miss him sorely. 
 
N. Jerold Cohen∗ 
Writing a short piece about Professor Bernie Wolfman is not easy 
because he was such a multifaceted man.  I had the pleasure of cross-
ing his path in several contexts and thus saw his many sides. 
My first meeting with Professor Wolfman was really unexpected.  I 
was on the National Board of the American Civil Liberties Union and 
someone tapped me on the shoulder.  It was Bernie, who introduced 
himself (of course I knew who he was) and said that he was glad to see 
me because tax lawyers were a minority on that board.  It was great to 
meet Bernie in person and to know that we had interests in common 
outside the tax code.  It was also fun to see him in that context, weigh-
ing in on questions of civil liberties rather than on tax issues. 
Bernie later asked me to serve with him as vice-chair of the Civil 
Rights Committee of the Individual Rights and Responsibilities Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association.  I was willing to do so because I 
knew three things.  First of all, I enjoyed participating in anything 
with Bernie.  Second, I knew that I would approve of the positions he 
would take.  Finally, having become well acquainted with his work ef-
forts, I knew that with Bernie at the helm I would not have to do any 
work. 
In serving with Bernie on the ACLU Board and in the Civil Rights 
Committee, I got to know his passion for civil rights and liberties.  
Many would say that made him a dyed-in-the-wool liberal.  You could 
not forget the “tax side” of Bernie, however.  His liberal leanings did 
not prevent him from scolding the very liberal Justice William O. 
Douglas on that subject in Dissent Without Opinion: The Behavior of 
Justice William O. Douglas in Federal Tax Cases.1  Many had thought 
that Justice Douglas’s opinions resulted from a personal encounter 
with the Internal Revenue Service, but, to my knowledge, only Bernie 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Partner, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP. 
 1 BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION (1975). 
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and his coauthors publicly took him to task.  This was, of course, only 
one of Bernie’s many excellent books and papers. 
Many tax professors write well, but do they teach well?  Bernie 
did.  I have heard that his students found him to be a professor of  
the first rank whose lectures and lessons were always very clear.  I got 
to experience just how skilled Bernie was in that regard one snowy 
day in New Hampshire.  Bernie had invited me to participate in a tax 
program he was putting on for the New Hampshire bar.  I agreed to 
attend, but the day before the program a snowstorm moved in.  I man-
aged to catch the last flight into Boston and drive up to New Hamp-
shire behind a snowplow.  I worried that only the speakers would at-
tend the conference, but Bernie just laughed and said that no New 
Hampshire lawyer would admit missing anything because of a snow-
storm.  He was right: the room was packed the next morning. 
Before we began, however, Bernie said we had a problem.  Missing 
from the conference was Marty Ginsburg, who had been grounded in 
New York by the weather.  So Bernie called all the speakers together 
and asked who was willing to give Marty’s part of the program.  We 
all looked down at our feet and no one responded.  “All right,” said 
Bernie, “I will do it.”  And he did — without missing a beat.  All of us 
were tremendously impressed and knew that we could not have done 
that.  It took a first-rate professor to step in and deliver someone else’s 
portion of the program as though he had intended to give it all along. 
But Bernie was not only a top-flight tax professor.  He also was an 
exceptionally well-rounded tax lawyer.  He worked with the Tax Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association and with the U.S. Treasury De-
partment and served as Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School.  Before embarking on his academic career, Bernie practiced 
with a major Philadelphia law firm for a number of years.  Even while 
teaching he continued practicing law as a consultant and expert wit-
ness.  He felt that this real-world experience enhanced his teaching.  I 
do not believe that it needed enhancing, but I am certain that his stu-
dents benefited from the broad background of their professor. 
In addition to watching him at work on the ACLU Board, the Tax 
Section of the ABA, and in lectures, I also enjoyed seeing him on a 
board with a number of well-known tax practitioners.  I was able to 
see Bernie interact with a select group of prominent tax lawyers when 
we both served on the Commerce Clearing House Board for its Tax 
Transactions Series.  His comments in our meetings were always right 
on point.  And they were closely listened to, even by a nationally 
known group of his peers. 
However, at one dinner given for the CCH Board at the Supreme 
Court, I found that not everyone always agreed with Bernie.  I was 
  
2012] BERNARD WOLFMAN 1893 
 
approached by Justice Ginsburg, who said, “You must talk to Bernie.  
He is teaching everyone in his class that our Gitlitz2 decision was 
wrong.”  The decision held that even if the IRS did not like the way 
the statute at issue was written, contending that it conferred an unin-
tended benefit on taxpayers, the remedy lay with Congress and not the 
courts.  Practitioners loved the decision, but I could not convince Ber-
nie, who felt it gave taxpayers a double benefit that the Code did not 
require. 
It was wonderful to see Bernie — and to see him shine — in so 
many different contexts.  I believe everyone who knew him felt the 
same way.  We are all going to miss him very much. 
 
Michael A. Fitts∗ 
In a sense, I have known Bernard Wolfman most of my life.  Even 
though I met him for the first time only a decade ago when I became 
Dean of Penn Law, while I was growing up in Philadelphia in the 
1960s and 1970s, Bernie was always larger than life. 
I heard many stories about Bernie from my father, who was also a 
professor at Penn, though at that other professional institution — the 
medical school — where he was chief of surgery.  My father, who’d 
met Bernie while both were in the Faculty Senate, viewed him as the 
model practitioner-academic, someone who moved effortlessly between 
practice and academia, as well as across schools within the University.  
I may not have understood all of these details as a child, but I did 
know from very early on that Bernie was special. 
I was delighted, then, some thirty years later to have the opportuni-
ty to finally connect with Bernie personally when he called me one day 
about the management of a marvelous public service fund, the Zelda 
Wolfman Fellowship, which he’d established years earlier in memory 
of his late first wife.  As our conversations about the fund became 
more frequent, it became clear that we both had ulterior motives.  I 
wanted to finally get to know the man I knew only as a legend, while 
Bernie wanted to reconnect with the institution to which he had de-
voted so much of his early life. 
In the end, Bernie and I developed a wonderful friendship, two 
deans separated by a generation, but united by their deep affection for 
an institution and a philosophy.  Just as a grandparent takes pleasure 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 2 Gitlitz v. Comm’r, 531 U.S. 206 (2001). 
 ∗ Dean and Bernard G. Segal Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
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in seeing his grandchildren grow, Bernie took great delight in seeing 
how the initiatives he had introduced years earlier had blossomed.  
Like all deans, Bernie took particular interest in the scholars he had 
recruited, such as Lou Pollak and Clyde Summers from Yale, who, he 
was delighted to know, continued to play such important roles at the 
Law School into the twenty-first century.  For my part, I relished the 
opportunity to get to know someone who had moved so effortlessly 
across fields, making such a difference in each, all while serving as an 
academic leader in the 1970s — one of the most challenging times in 
our nation’s history. 
While Bernie was already close to retirement when we first met, his 
passion for people and institutions was still readily apparent.  As my 
colleagues have often told me over the years, there were no lengths 
Bernie would not go in support of a person, institution, or cause about 
which he cared.  Whether he was recounting in glowing terms the pro-
fessional achievements of his wife Toni — herself another of our dis-
tinguished alumnae — or inquiring into the status of the yearly fellow-
ship award, he always did so with uncommon enthusiasm.  Bernie’s 
zeal was part of what made him such an excellent attorney, fantastic 
educator, dedicated mentor, and engaging friend. 
Of course, his professional identity was initially formed at Penn, 
where he earned his law degree, but he was deeply impacted by his le-
gal practice at the Philadelphia firm of Wolf, Block.  As fellow Penn 
Professor Howard Lesnick recently observed, “[H]e was first and most 
deeply a lawyer, with a breadth of vision about what that means 
which even in his generation was rare enough.”1  It was while still 
working as an attorney that Bernie first returned to Penn Law in 1960, 
serving as an adjunct professor for three years before joining the facul-
ty full time — at the time a unique transition in and of itself — in 
1963 as the Kenneth W. Gemmill Professor of Tax Law and Tax Policy. 
Bernie always brought to his teaching a well-developed under-
standing of what tax lawyers actually do and was committed to in-
creasing the number of clinical programs at the law school as early as 
1970, well ahead of his time.  He knew that the law and law school 
needed to make a difference in the world.   
At the same time, he was committed to the life of the mind and  
interdisciplinary scholarship at a period when that vision was more 
ideal than reality.  Bernie was one of a number of Philadelphia tax 
lawyers who met regularly to debate tax policy, and, as Dean, he 
moved to establish the nation’s first joint graduate degree program in 
law and public policy.  Sponsored by the Law School and the Fels 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 Email from Howard Lesnick, Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa. Law 
Sch., to author (Jan. 20, 2012) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
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Center of Government, this joint program not only set the stage for the 
development of similar programs nationwide, but also served as the 
foundation for Penn Law’s cross-disciplinary focus, which has blos-
somed into a distinctive and distinguishing feature of the modern Penn 
Law. 
The fact that these advances were made at a time of such great in-
stitutional stress makes them all the more remarkable.  When Bernie 
took over the deanship, students were voicing increasingly intense de-
mands for greater participation in governance and a more relevant 
curriculum.  While Bernie may have been seen by some as being part 
of the old guard, he fully understood his critical role in seeing the Law 
School through this pressing social and political divide. 
And Bernie took these difficult matters in stride, even seeming to 
relish the challenge the students’ opposition provided.  He even had 
sufficient perspective at the time to observe that “students help shake 
up our agenda; they make us rethink our priorities for action. . . . 
[T]hey get many of us mad at them some of the time.  But they are go-
ing to be fine lawyers whose impact on the law and on justice holds 
unparalleled promise.”2 
In the end, Bernie adjusted the school’s curriculum to reflect the 
students’ best and most reasonable demands and allowed them to 
serve on all Law School committees and even to attend faculty meet-
ings, both of which represented institutional changes of historic pro-
portions.  Only someone exceptionally well versed in the challenges of 
professional and personal transitions could have so successfully navi-
gated such changes. 
Bernie’s commitment to students extended to the individual level 
as well.  Professor Regina Austin was a law student when Bernie was 
Dean, at a time when there were few black students and not a single 
black professor at Penn.  Despite first-year jitters, Professor Austin did 
exceptionally well. 
Still, as a second-year student, Professor Austin recently told me, 
she knew nothing about law firm recruiting.3  Not only were there no 
lawyers in her family; there were no college graduates.  But Bernie 
stepped in quickly to fill the void, sending Professor Austin down to 
the “Schnader firm,” as he called it, for an interview during her second 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 2 Bernard Wolfman, Wolfman, Fordham Discuss Concerns, U. PA. LAW ALUMNI J., Summer 
1970, at 18, 19. 
 3 Email from Regina Austin, William A. Schnader Professor of Law and Dir., Penn Program 
on Documentaries & the Law, to author (Jan. 21, 2012) (on file with the Harvard Law School  
Library). 
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year.4  Bernie and the firm’s chairman, Bernard Segal — an ardent 
civil rights supporter — had arranged for her to be interviewed.5 
“I remember that I wore my favorite dress, a striped cotton mini,” 
Professor Austin recalls.  “Of course, I also had a big Afro.  I am sure 
that I looked like a kid.  I barely weighed 90 pounds.  I do not know if 
every second-year prospect had a meeting with Mr. Segal in his office 
at the end of his interview[,] but I did.  I got the summer job . . . [and] 
joined the firm as an associate after completing a clerkship.”6 
And Bernie’s support did not end there.  When Professor Austin 
went on the teaching market years later, he made sure she was consid-
ered by several top-tier law schools.  Appropriately enough, Professor 
Austin is now the William A. Schnader Professor of Law at Penn.  
“I hope that over the years I have repaid his faith in me,” Professor 
Austin recounted to me in learning about his passing.  “Dean Wolfman 
was one of the best guardian angels a young budding black working-
class female academic could possibly have had.”7 
So too was Bernie a mentor to me through both his model of 
thoughtful stewardship and his wonderful knack for successfully roll-
ing with the institutional punches.  I will miss our talks and his cheer-
ful insights, but most especially I will miss the great example of Ber-
nie’s boundless passion.  My father was right.  Bernie was, and is,  
special. 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg∗ 
Bernard Wolfman was my daughter’s tax professor, my husband’s 
working colleague — first in practice, later in the academy — and our 
treasured friend.  As a practicing lawyer, Bernie was known for his 
skill in structuring transactions, his ability to see around corners, his 
good humor, and his wit.  As a law professor, by all accounts, he was a 
grand master of the Socratic art, which he used to enlighten, not to 
embarrass or wound.  I am not among the tax cognoscenti, and there-
fore am not qualified to speak of Bernie’s lead role on matters of tax 
practice, scholarship, and policy.  But I have had the good fortune of 
association with him in human rights endeavors, and, together with his 
wife Toni, on travel adventures in the United States and abroad. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 ∗ Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States. 
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On Bernie’s sympathique qualities, I recall an anxious day in the 
spring of 1978, during my semester at Stanford’s Center for Advanced 
Study in the Behavioral Sciences.  I was in San Francisco for a meet-
ing of a Bar committee on which Bernie and I served.  Midway 
through the meeting, a caller informed me that my then twelve-year-
old son had been taken to the Stanford Clinic to repair a broken nose 
and other wounds occasioned by a bicycle accident.  I left the meeting 
at once and Bernie rushed to my side.  “Let me drive you to the Clin-
ic,” he volunteered.  “You need company, and it will be safer that way.”  
That act of kindness made the next hours more bearable for me. 
Family mattered to Bernie.  He was proud of Toni’s accomplish-
ments and supportive of her efforts to help women gain a fairer deal at 
work and at home.  I recall a day in Court: Bernie and Toni were seat-
ed in the front row, Bernie’s son, Brian Wolfman, then Director of 
Public Citizen’s Litigation Group, was at the lectern.  Brian’s argu-
ment was, as usual for him, finely honed.  Bernie and Toni listened at-
tentively.  In another setting, they would have cheered when Brian 
was done.  The constraints of courtroom decorum precluded their ap-
plause, but one could sense their exaltation. 
Bernie Wolfman was the very best of lawyers and law teachers, 
and an all-around good citizen.  If genuine tax reform is achieved one 
fine day, it will come about because Bernie and a few others of his  
stature paved the way. 
 
Martha Minow∗ 
Bernie Wolfman was a great man.  A devoted teacher and loving 
family man, he also lived according to high ethical commitments and 
indeed integrated ethical values in all he did.  His landmark book, 
Ethical Problems in Federal Tax Practice,1 and the related course he 
created pioneered the vital approach to professional responsibility 
teaching that embeds ethics in the daily work and problem-solving of 
lawyers. 
Bernie stood up for what he believed and inspired others to do so.  
As a volunteer attorney, his research led to the landmark Supreme 
Court decision directing public schools to stop conducting prayers.2  As 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Dean and Jeremiah Smith, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School. 
 1 BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX 
PRACTICE (1981). 
 2 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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a leading expert in tax law, he devised an argument crucial to the Su-
preme Court when it addressed whether a private university should 
retain its tax-exempt status.3  Bob Jones University had racially dis-
criminatory policies — initially excluding Blacks altogether and later 
forbidding interracial dating.4  Lower courts upheld the IRS decision 
to withhold tax-exempt status from Bob Jones University, but then, 
with a change in administration, the IRS changed its view and the 
government moved to vacate the lower court decisions.  Bernie’s ar-
gument, forged with his colleague Larry Tribe, defended the denial of 
the tax exemption and preserved the issue for consideration by the Su-
preme Court.5  Despite the government’s effort to change the policy 
and to avoid judicial review, the Court affirmed the policy against ra-
cial discrimination and established the still critical policy that even re-
ligious claims cannot shield racial discrimination from prohibition of 
government support. 
It is fitting to celebrate Bernie’s accomplishments, his memorable 
teaching and scholarship, and more.  Here, I want to celebrate his 
kindness.  That is what he showed me when I arrived here 30 years 
ago, when the school had one tenured woman professor.  I will never 
forget how Bernie welcomed me, treated me as someone who belonged 
here.  His support and encouragement really made a difference.  He 
even willingly sat through an interview with me when I wanted to 
learn about single-sex schools, and he regaled me with vivid memories 
of Central High.  His bountiful love for and pride in his wonderful 
family I first saw when he told me about Brian, whom I was lucky 
enough to teach, and the kindness he showed me, other colleagues, and 
students reflected his great capacity to love. 
“Light dawns in darkness for the upright, gracious and merciful 
and just,” says Psalm 112.6  Even with his passing, all who knew Ber-
nie will cherish how he lighted the way, with integrity, excellence, and 
love. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 Brief of Laurence H. Tribe and Bernard Wolfman as Amici Curiae with Respect to Re-
spondent’s Motion to Vacate, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1, 
81-3), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1232 [hereinafter Tribe/Wolfman Brief]; see also Bernard 
Wolfman, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology, 99 HARV. L. REV. 491 (1985) (book review). 
 4 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 580–81. 
 5 Tribe/Wolfman Brief, supra note 3, at *8 n.3. 
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Daniel N. Shaviro∗ 
I first met Bernie Wolfman in 1989, at a Harvard Law School tax 
conference in Cape Cod.  In those days, strange though it may seem 
now, intergenerational relations within the legal tax academic commu-
nity could at times be tense, reflecting (I suppose) both ongoing trans-
formations in the style and methodology of legal scholarship, and, per-
haps, some of the personalities on both sides.  While Bernie was firmly 
ensconced, both socially and intellectually, on the more senior scholars’ 
side of this divide, and was one who, when he had strong views, did 
not hesitate to express them, I always found him exceptionally kind, 
gracious, welcoming, and open-minded. 
In subsequent years, when I saw him at conferences and otherwise, 
we would frequently talk, and not just about the issues (and of course 
personalities) in our field.  My favorite story of his related to World 
War II.  He had been with one of the units that got encircled and near-
ly obliterated by German forces at the Battle of the Bulge.  Luckily for 
him, as it turned out, he needed to be evacuated to a U.S. military 
hospital only a couple of days before the surprise attack hit.  He, with 
his unit, had been trudging through the Ardennes in the brutal winter 
of 1944–1945, wearing inadequate shoes that the U.S. Army had com-
missioned for use in the North African desert campaigns against 
Rommel.  He got severe frostbite, from which his feet apparently never 
fully recovered.  But he realized in retrospect that what happened to 
his unit next might have proven even worse.1 
Bernie’s extraordinary passions, not just for good tax policy but for 
personal and professional ethics, are strongly reflected in both of his 
most famous academic writings: Dissent Without Opinion: The Behav-
ior of Justice William O. Douglas in Federal Tax Cases,2 and The Su-
preme Court in the Lyon’s Den: A Failure of Judicial Process.3  These 
remain recommended reading for new generations of tax academics, 
lawyers, and students, both for their analysis and their style.  Each, 
however, has an important legal ethics backstory that evidently helped 
motivate a thorough demolishing of this otherwise gentle man’s chosen 
targets. 
Dissent Without Opinion addresses the bizarre behavior in tax  
cases of Justice William O. Douglas, who was still on the Supreme 
Court at the time that the study came out.  Justice Douglas was in 
some circles a vaunted liberal lion; in others, a lightning rod for grow-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Wayne Perry Professor of Taxation, NYU Law School. 
 1 The fact that my father, during World War II, flew in a Pacific squadron that apparently 
lost all of its planes except for his, may have added to this story’s resonance for me. 
 2 BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION (1975). 
 3 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1981). 
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ing conservative anger about the 1960s Warren Court.4  While much of 
that controversy has passed, to this day law students who take Tax I 
may be bemused by the sheer number of Justice Douglas’s stand-alone, 
antigovernment dissents without opinion, punctuated by a few cases in 
which he has jotted down a few paragraphs breezily asserting IRS bad 
faith5 or deliberately ignoring the factual record of the case along with 
prior case authority.6 
Stranger still, Justice Douglas had started his Supreme Court career 
as a frequent supporter of IRS positions that required relatively expan-
sive or flexible readings of unclear statutes.  As Daniel B. Evans has 
noted, the “accepted explanation of this odd voting record is that [Jus-
tice Douglas] still was angry at having once been audited by the IRS.”7  
I have even informally heard a specific date — 1948 — as being when 
this ill-chosen audit occurred.  The article, however, while not specifi-
cally mentioning this theory — which a mutual friend assured me 
Wolfman was familiar with — presents and carefully documents a 
more nuanced and gradual account of how a talented legal thinker 
gradually succumbed to self-infatuated intellectual hubris.  We learn 
that Justice Douglas went through four sharply delineated periods: the 
“government years” (1939–1943), “a shift to the taxpayer” (1943–1959), 
the “extreme years” (1959–1964), and “tempered rebellion” (1964 
through the book’s 1973 publication date), leading to absurd and inde-
fensible inconsistencies both within and across periods. 
The overall picture that emerges is no more edifying than the 
standard view that Justice Douglas had been lashing out because he 
disliked being audited, but it is considerably subtler.  We learn in close 
detail about how a life-tenured judge, convinced he had been striking 
great blows for personal freedom, gradually surrendered to self-
indulgent emotionalism at the expense of bothering to engage in seri-
ous legal analysis, reflecting what became “an overwhelming orienta-
tion to result . . . [and an] ‘indifference to the texture of legal analysis, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 Gerald Ford, for example — at the time the House Republican Minority Leader — sought 
in 1970 to have Justice Douglas impeached for asserted improper behavior.  See Gerald R. Ford, 
House Floor Speech: Impeach Justice Douglas, Box D29, Gerald R. Ford Congressional  
Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library, available at http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/speeches 
/700415a.htm. 
 5 See, e.g., Comm’r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 21 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stop-
ping just short of accusing the IRS of deliberate intellectual dishonesty: “That is not to impugn 
the integrity of the IRS.  It is only an illustration of the capricious character of how law is con-
strued to get from the taxpayer the greatest possible return that is permissible under the Code.”). 
 6 See, for example, Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269, 278 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing), in which, as Wolfman, Silver, and Silver note, he simply ignores the factual record of the 
case, as well as prior precedent, in order to assert his own shorthand conclusions.  See WOLFMAN 
ET AL., supra note 2, at 54–58. 
 7 Daniel B. Evans, The Tax Protestor FAQ, EVANS-LEGAL, http://evans-legal.com/dan 
/tpfaq.html#incomedef (last updated Feb. 27, 2011). 
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which arises from an exclusively political conception of the judicial 
role.’”8  Conservative critics of Justice Douglas could not have put it 
any more starkly, although Wolfman expressly admired Justice Doug-
las’s judicial “vision of a free America in a system of law,”9 and evi-
dently wanted the Justice just to live up to “his own standard.”10  The 
cautionary tale is one that today’s conservative ideologues on the 
Court might do well to think about. 
The Supreme Court in the Lyon’s Den: A Failure of Judicial Pro-
cess likewise addresses Supreme Court jurisprudence — here, a deci-
sion, Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,11 that, as Wolfman notes, made 
the Supreme Court a “laughingstock” among tax lawyers.12  The case 
was a “fairly mundane financing transaction”13 for a building, in 
which the taxpayers employed a sale-leaseback structure so that the 
mortgage lender would nominally become the property’s owner, per-
mitting it, in lieu of the true economic owner, to be the party that 
could claim depreciation deductions.  Among the decision’s idiocies 
were its reliance on no fewer than “twenty-six factors peculiar to this 
transaction,”14 thus undercutting its precedential value and making 
one wonder why the Supreme Court had bothered to intervene, and — 
the point that made the Court a laughingstock — its insistence that a 
tax deal’s legitimacy could be strongly supported by the insertion of an 
otherwise irrelevant third party into a tax planning transaction.15 
What makes the article more than just a critique of a single poorly 
reasoned Supreme Court decision is its legal ethics backstory.  At the 
time when Wolfman wrote this article, one of his most eminent col-
leagues in the tax and academic world was Erwin Griswold, whose ré-
sumé included stints not just as Dean of Harvard Law School, but also 
as Solicitor General of the United States.  We learn in Lyon’s Den that 
the taxpayer in the case had retained Griswold to file its Supreme 
Court certiorari brief, and that Griswold subsequently signed (and pre-
sumably wrote) the taxpayer’s briefs while also presenting its oral ar-
gument16 — all this to an audience of Supreme Court Justices who had 
come to know him well in his only recently concluded role as the gov-
ernment’s advocate.  Griswold evidently took advantage of his position 
to lend credibility to repeated assertions — which remained 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 135 (quoting Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Pangloss, N.Y. 
REV. BOOKS, Oct. 22, 1964, at 5, 6). 
 9 Id. at 138. 
 10 Id. at 5. 
 11 435 U.S. 561 (1978). 
 12 Wolfman, supra note 3, at 1099. 
 13 Id. at 1076. 
 14 Id. at 1099. 
 15 Id. at 1099–1100. 
 16 Id. at 1084 n.51. 
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uncontradicted by (perhaps overawed) government counsel — that 
were at best extremely misleading.  In particular: 
Taxpayer’s counsel repeatedly asserted to the Court, without challenge by 
the government, that . . . [the parties to the sale-leaseback] were “subject 
to identical tax rates,” that there was “no differential in tax rate,” “no ef-
fort to take advantage of a tax differential,” and “no special tax circum-
stance.”  On the basis of such assertions, the Court concluded that there 
was no net revenue at stake.17 
This was untrue.  The deduction “seller” in the transaction had the 
ability to reduce its taxable income to zero, if so it chose, wholly with-
out regard to the depreciation deductions from this building, whereas 
the deduction “buyer” faced a true forty-eight percent marginal tax 
rate.18  Thus, the transaction clearly served tax planning objectives 
that Griswold told the Supreme Court were absent.  He surely knew 
better, and it is plausible that his evident willingness to “make asser-
tions that lack[ed] a basis in the record”19 reflected a shrewd judgment 
that his lofty reputation — most particularly, in the Solicitor General’s 
office and in the minds of Supreme Court Justices — would aid him in 
getting away with it. 
To one with Bernie Wolfman’s moral compass, this was offense 
enough to require a public calling-out despite his personal connection 
to Griswold (who had written a laudatory foreword to Dissent Without 
Opinion).  Lyon’s Den is not written in such a way that the general 
reading public would see just how pointedly Griswold was being 
called out for ethically dubious behavior.  However, when I first be-
came a tax academic, a senior colleague assured me that, within the 
close-knit legal tax academic community of the 1970s, it was very well 
understood indeed, not least by Griswold himself.  In today’s entre-
preneurial world, it would be a good thing if experts-for-hire still had 
Bernie Wolfman to worry about. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 Id. at 1094–95 (footnotes omitted). 
 18 See id. at 1095–98. 
 19 Id. at 1101. 
